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Regret in Repeat Purchase versus Switching




The decision-making literature has consistently reported that decisions to maintain
the status quo tend to be regretted less than decisions to change it. We examine
the consequences of repeat purchasing (maintaining the status quo) versus switch-
ing in the context of information regarding the reason for the decision (e.g., prior
consumption episode, brand history), and we argue that there are situations in
which repeat purchasing may cause as much or even more regret than switching.
We contend that this effect depends on whether or not there is a justifiable basis
for the decision. In a series of four studies, we show that if there is sufficient
motivation to warrant a switch, consumers will feel less regret in the face of a
subsequent negative outcome realized via a switch than in one realized via a repeat
purchase. Our results imply that feelings of regret are mitigated when the consumer
reflects and concludes that the decision was appropriate under the circumstances.
Consumers must often decide whether to continue doingthings as they have been doing them or to do them
differently. For instance, consumers must decide whether or
not to switch car-care centers, vacation destinations, hotels,
and laundry detergents. When making these decisions, con-
sumers try to maximize their own satisfaction or utility while
choosing an option that protects them from negative emotion
(e.g., Luce 1998; Simonson 1992), and regret has been iden-
tified as a primary negative emotion (e.g., Inman, Dyer, and
Jia 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov 1999; Tsiros and
Mittal 2000). For example, regret was the most frequently
named negative emotion in a study of verbal expressions of
emotions in everyday conversation (Shimanoff 1984). Thus,
it is important to understand the conditions under which
switching versus repeat-purchase decisions result in greater
regret.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s (1988) notion of the status
quo effect is particularly relevant in this context. Samuelson
and Zeckhauser define the status quo effect as the tendency
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to maintain “one’s current or previous decision. Faced with
new options, decision makers often stick with the status quo
alternative, for example, to follow customary company pol-
icy, to elect an incumbent to still another term in office, to
purchase the same product brands, or to stay in the same
job” (p. 8). In other words, having made a decision, people
tend to repeat it. While the status quo effect entails an ex-
aggerated preference for inaction (i.e., omission bias) and
an exaggerated preference for the current state of affairs,
our focus is on the second aspect because both a switch and
a repeat decision involve action. Repeating maintains the
status quo; switching changes it. Since both of these deci-
sions require an action on the part of the consumer, we can
isolate the effect of underlying circumstances on the ensuing
regret. Most of the research into omission or status quo bias
deals with contexts in which both action and status quo are
more clearly defined, so we also raise questions about the
applicability of this research in a repeat/switching context.
To be precise, we use the term “status quo effect” in this
article to describe consumers’ tendency to feel more regret
following a decision to switch than following a decision to
repeat a past decision (e.g., to choose the same brand).
The status quo effect suggests that a decision maker’s
satisfaction with the outcome of a decision does not depend
solely on that particular outcome and on how it compares
to alternative outcomes. Rather, these evaluative reactions
also depend on how the outcome is achieved; outcomes
achieved through decisions to change the status quo gen-
erally lead to more intense regret than the same outcomes
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achieved through decisions to maintain the status quo. There
is a substantial body of evidence in this regard in both the
economics (e.g., Hartman, Doane and Woo 1991; Kahne-
man, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser
1988) and psychology literatures (e.g., Baron and Ritov
1994; Hesketh 1996; Ritov and Baron 1992).
In the context of consumer decision making, the status
quo phenomenon suggests that consumers have a tendency
to repeat purchase—that is, to select the same brand over
subsequent purchase decisions. Furthermore, the status quo
effect implies that, given a negative experience, consumers
should feel less regret when this experience is the result of
a repeat decision than when it is the result of a switch
decision. Landman’s research (1987) illustrates this phe-
nomenon. Most subjects (81%) examining the two scenarios
below felt that the switching Sayer family would feel more
regret than the repeating Lowell family:
For years the Lowell family has vacationed in Key West,
Florida, during the last 10 days of December. This year they
considered vacationing in Sarasota, Florida, but decided to
return to Key West after all. Unfortunately, it rained all 10
days in Key West; Sarasota was mostly dry.
For years the Sayer family has vacationed in Sarasota, Flor-
ida, during the last 10 days of December. This year they
decided to vacation in Key West instead. Unfortunately, it
rained all 10 days in Key West; Sarasota was mostly dry.
Who feels more regret about their vacation decision, the Low-
ells or the Sayers? (Landman 1987, p. 529)
Are there conditions under which a decision to switch
might result in less regret than a decision to repeat? If so,
the implications of the status quo effect may have been
overgeneralized to imply that changes to the status quo
should invariably produce more regret (e.g., Schweitzer
1994, 1995). We argue that previous research on regret and
the status quo effect has largely failed to consider that de-
cisions are typically made in the context of prior experiences
and outcomes and that these may have a considerable impact
on the regret consumers experience in regards to current
decision outcomes. In our view, prior experiences can pro-
vide reasons for switching, and these reasons may attenuate
the regret consumers feel when their decisions go awry.
Recent research suggests that the regret a consumer feels
after a negative experience is related to the extent to which
s/he blames him or herself for it (e.g., Ordóñez and Connolly
2000). Having good reasons to switch may protect the con-
sumer from regret when s/he opts to switch. If prior ex-
perience (e.g., the previous outcome, extent of previous ex-
perience with the original course of action) leads a consumer
to determine that his/her decision was the most reasonable
given the circumstances, then arguably s/he should feel less
regret. In other words, decisions supported by good reasons
should attenuate postdecision regret.
In the following sections, we discuss the status quo effect
literature and the potential role of reasons for the decision
as a moderator of this effect. We then present a series of
four studies. The first two demonstrate a complete reversal
of the status quo effect and some boundary conditions for
this reversal, and the last two address the psychological
explanation of these findings. Study 1 both replicates and
reverses the status quo effect in a consumer setting by pro-
viding information about a previous consumption experi-
ence. Study 2 then examines the role of another source of
prior information: length of history with the status quo al-
ternative. Study 3 demonstrates that prior-experience infor-
mation serves as a reason for the subsequent decision of
whether to repeat or switch. In study 4, we experimentally
manipulate reasons in order to examine whether strong rea-
sons attenuate the status quo effect and in order to test
whether the status quo effect is mediated by the perceived
justifiability of the decision. We conclude by discussing the
four studies’ implications and possible directions of future
research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Regret is “the painful sensation of recognizing that ‘what
is’ compares unfavorably with ‘what might have been’”
(Sugden 1985, p. 77). Kahneman and Miller (1986) use
norm theory to explain the finding that changing the status
quo results in more regret than maintaining it. They argue
that switching produces more regret because maintaining
the status quo is considered to be more normal. Relatedly,
Simonson (1992) examined subjects’ assessments of regret
in search patterns for a journal article. Subjects reported that
they would feel greater regret if they started searching from
the last issue and found the article in the first issue than if
they had started searching from the first issue and found it
in the last issue. Simonson argues that searching from the
beginning is the default option (i.e., the status quo option)
and that deviating from this search strategy results in greater
regret. Expanding on this reasoning, Kahneman and Miller
(1986) posit that people feel more regret after a decision
when they can easily imagine a better alternative outcome
(e.g., the status quo) than when it is hard to imagine a better
outcome. Switching results in more regret because it is easier
to mentally change a switching action into a repeat-purchase
action and thereby undo the outcome.
Schweitzer (1995) examined the role of the status quo
effect in the context of flexible spending accounts (FSA).
University staff members were shown a scenario in which
they were asked to advise a friend on how much to invest
in an FSA. Half of the subjects were shown status quo
contributions of $600 per year, and half were shown status
quo contributions of $1,000 per year. Regardless of status
quo contribution condition, respondents were much more
likely to recommend the status quo than a change from it.
Luce (1998) showed that a status quo effect occurs in the
context of consumer choice. She confronted subjects with
a choice between five cars and asked them to imagine that
they had already tentatively chosen one of those before the
others came on the market. She reports that choosing the
status quo was associated with lower levels of negative emo-
tion. Luce argues that the status quo effect “may result from
a psychological commitment to the status quo situation, per-
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haps because deviations from the status quo are associated
with increased levels of regret” (p. 429).
If regret is indeed related to self-blame and affected by
the reasons supporting the decision, it is interesting to note
that, in the typical scenario, the reasons for choosing to
maintain the status quo or to switch are not at all clear. For
example, in Landman’s (1987) scenario with the two va-
cationing families, subjects knew neither why the Sayers
decided to switch to Key West nor why the Lowells decided
not to switch. In answering the question about who would
feel more regret, subjects might try to explain why the two
families decided differently. Since maintaining the status
quo is the default option, subjects may well have inferred
that the Sayers had less justification for their decision to
change destination and therefore determined that the Sayers
had made a foolish decision. Thus, a central question is
whether decisions to change the status quo are always “ab-
normal,” to use the terminology of norm theory. The ro-
bustness of the status quo effect phenomenon suggests they
are. We argue that they are not. In our view, switching
decisions are only abnormal when there are no good reasons
supporting them. Furthermore, we argue that when a situ-
ation demands a change from the normal routine, maintain-
ing the status quo is more abnormal than switching. For
example, we predict that if a consumer has a negative ex-
perience with a hotel chain, s/he should exhibit a tendency
to do something about it.
Our line of reasoning is supported, albeit indirectly, by
the common expression “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” This
saying suggests that one’s decision to make a change or not
might be based on earlier experiences. The saying also sug-
gests, at least implicitly, that one should make a change
when circumstances suggest that a change is in order. Con-
sistent with this reasoning, research on individual decision
making has shown that choices are often made in light of
prior investments, costs, and outcomes (e.g., Thaler and
Johnson 1990). Similarly, game-theoretic research shows
that people may base their decisions on a simple win-stay/
lose-change heuristic (e.g., Macy 1995). This heuristic im-
plies that a decision maker should maintain his/her strategy
by default and change strategy only if previous events give
him/her a reason to do so. This leads us to propose that
prior experiences can induce a tendency to change strategies
and consequently make switching a sounder, more justifiable
decision than maintaining the status quo.
Our first objective is to demonstrate the status quo effect
in a consumer repeat purchase setting. That is, switching
tends to be regretted more than repeating when the subse-
quent outcome is unsatisfactory. In the absence of infor-
mation regarding prior experience, subjects’ beliefs in an
efficient market should lead them to infer that the prior
experience was positive. If so, the pattern of results observed
in a control (no prior information) condition will be similar
to that observed when reinforcing information is provided
(e.g., a positive prior experience).
H1: In the absence of prior information or when re-
inforcing prior information is available, a decision
to switch will be regretted more than a decision
to repeat.
Central to our reasoning is the relationship between rea-
sons and regret. We argue that decisions that are not backed
up by good reasons are especially likely to produce regret.
Thus we predict that if the subsequent outcome ultimately
turns out to be negative, the consumer may experience less
regret because s/he can rationalize that the choice was the
best in light of the circumstances. In other words, good
reasons for a choice should inoculate the decision maker
against regret. At the same time, bad reasons for a choice
should amplify the decision maker’s regret because s/he
should have known better. Work by Ritov and Baron (1992)
suggests that the underlying reasons for the decision might
play a role in postdecision regret. They sought to decouple
omission bias from the status quo effect, and in contrast to
Schweitzer (1994), they found that subjects preferred in-
action to action regardless of whether the inaction was as-
sociated with a change from the status quo. Across their
five scenarios, subjects consistently felt that the result re-
ceived through an act would result in greater regret, irre-
spective of whether or not the act maintained the status quo.
Interestingly, their scenarios in the inaction/change condi-
tion provided a reason for the change, albeit a rather poor
one. For example, the airline scenario described a man who
was asked to switch flights “for bureaucratic reasons.” The
man did not object, the plane crashed, and he was injured.
These results are consistent with our thesis: subjects may
have incorporated the presence of a reason into their as-
sessment and hence indicated less regret even though the
outcome was produced by switching away from the status
quo.
H2: A strong reason for a decision will result in lower
subsequent regret.
Relatedly, when the strong reason (e.g., a negative-
experience episode) leads to the need to switch, this should
cause a reversal of the status quo effect. Thus, the status
quo effect might not only be mitigated (hypothesis 2) but
even reversed in the case of negative feedback regarding
the earlier outcome. That is, when a strong reason exists for
changing, repeat purchase may be regretted more than
switching to another alternative. We predict that when neg-
ative information on the current course of action is expe-
rienced but no avoidance action is undertaken, more regret
will be experienced if the subsequent outcome is also neg-
ative. In such instances, changing the status quo should be
preferred to maintaining it. If this is so, people may regret
repeat purchase more than switching. Thus, we anticipate a
disordinal interaction:decision # prior-experience
H3: Regret will be greater in both the negative-prior-
experience/repeat and the positive-prior-experience/
switch conditions than in the negative/switch and
positive/repeat conditions.
These three hypotheses are tested in study 1. The studies
reported in this article use scenario-based manipulations that
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TABLE 1
STUDIES 1 AND 2: REGRET MEANS ACROSS CONDITIONS
Study 2
Study 1 High history Low history
Repeat Switch Repeat Switch Repeat Switch
Pooled average:
Control 6.56 (1.79) 7.50 (1.71) 6.40 (1.56) 8.09 (1.15) 7.15 (1.39) 7.78 (1.39)
Positive prior experience 6.77 (1.51) 7.56 (1.52) 6.22 (1.61) 8.25 (1.17) 6.69 (1.25) 7.87 (1.65)
Negative prior experience 8.09 (1.16) 5.80 (1.13) 7.98 (1.44) 7.03 (1.45) 8.45 (1.09) 6.30 (1.38)
Airline:
Control 6.67 (2.09) 7.61 (1.93) 6.18 (1.93) 8.19 (1.60) 7.23 (1.74) 8.11 (1.72)
Positive prior experience 6.66 (1.85) 7.69 (1.91) 6.16 (1.98) 8.82 (1.26) 6.65 (1.59) 8.47 (1.58)
Negative prior experience 8.13 (1.46) 5.55 (1.36) 7.95 (1.74) 6.59 (1.93) 8.47 (1.25) 6.37 (1.47)
Backpack:
Control 6.42 (2.19) 7.50 (1.86) 6.35 (1.85) 7.82 (1.56) 6.99 (1.66) 7.71 (1.32)
Positive prior experience 7.05 (1.79) 7.44 (1.84) 6.08 (1.97) 7.61 (1.60) 6.83 (1.49) 7.20 (2.19)
Negative prior experience 7.85 (1.67) 6.28 (1.39) 7.67 (2.05) 7.27 (1.65) 8.75 (.96) 6.25 (1.82)
Hotel:
Control 6.60 (2.28) 7.39 (2.07) 6.67 (1.88) 8.26 (1.35) 7.25 (1.75) 7.51 (1.80)
Positive prior experience 6.59 (2.01) 7.54 (1.78) 6.42 (1.75) 8.33 (1.28) 6.59 (1.68) 7.94 (2.09)
Negative prior experience 8.32 (1.47) 5.57 (1.63) 8.31 (1.56) 7.24 (1.71) 8.11 (1.77) 6.27 (1.64)
NOTE.—Standard deviation is shown in parentheses.
are the norm in status quo research (e.g., Landman’s 1987
study described earlier). However, in contrast to the within-
subjects design typically employed in this area, we use
between-subjects designs to mitigate the potential for de-
mand effects. In fact, recent research on omission bias re-
ports that this bias disappears in a between-subjects design
(N’gbala and Branscombe 1997), although it is unclear
whether this also holds for the status quo effect.
STUDY 1
Method
Subjects and Design.Two hundred and forty under-
graduate business students at a large midwestern university
participated in this study and were compensated by extra
credit. Two factors—decision (switch or repeat purchase)
and prior experience (control, positive, or negative)—were
manipulated between subjects and replicated across three
product categories.
Procedure. Each subject examined three scenarios
about an experience with a service or product. One scenario
described an airline, one involved a backpack, and another
described a hotel stay.1 We manipulated prior experience by
describing the experience as being either incident-free (pos-
itive) or unpleasant in some fashion (negative). No infor-
mation about prior experience was provided in the control
condition. After the prior-experience manipulation, we ma-
nipulated decision at two levels (i.e., switch or repeat pur-
chase) by describing the subject in the scenario as either
switching to a different alternative or as selecting the same
alternative on the next choice occasion. In order to induce
1All scenarios are available from the authors.
a sense of regret, the second experience was always negative.
Scenario order was randomized in all studies.
Measures. After finishing each scenario, subjects com-
pleted a three-item regret scale that assessed the subjects’
regret in regards to the decision to switch or repeat (a p
, 0.73, and 0.76 for the airline, backpack, and hotel0.75
scenarios, respectively):2 “How much would you regret your
decision to stay with (switch to) ___?” (anchored by not
regret at all/regret very much), “If you could do it over,
would you change your decision?” (anchored by definitely
would not change/definitely would change), and “How much
happier would you have been if you had made a different
decision?” (anchored by not much happier/much happier).
All items used in this research were on a 10-point scale.
Results
We analyze the data with a 2 (decision: switch/repeat)
# 3 (prior experience: control/positive/negative) MAN-
OVA. Means by condition are given in table 1. Hypothesis
1 predicts that the control, the no-prior-experience group,
will report greater regret in the switch condition than in
the repeat condition. As we show in table 1, this is the
case. Regret is greater in the switch condition than in the
repeat condition for each scenario in the control group,
and this difference is statistically significant in all three
scenarios (i.e., airline: , ; backpack:t p 2.48 p ! .01232
, ; and hotel: , ). Thus,t p 2.81 p ! .01 t p 1.96 p ! .05232 232
hypothesis 1 is supported, representing the first replication
of the status quo effect in a between-subjects design.
2Subjects also completed a three-item believability scale in our studies.
This scale was entered as a covariate in the analyses and was insignificant.
Thus, it is not discussed further.
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Hypothesis 1 also predicts that the results in the control
condition will not differ significantly from the results in the
positive-prior-experience condition. A MANOVA with only
the control and positive-prior-experience conditions results
in a decision main effect (Wilks’s lambda F(3, 158) p
, ), while the inter-4.00 p ! .01 decision # prior-experience
action fails to achieve significance. These results are rep-
licated in each scenario-level ANOVA. Hypothesis 1 is thus
fully supported. In the absence of any information regarding
the prior experience, subjects seem to have concluded that
the prior experience was relatively positive, thus causing
the control-condition results to mirror those of the positive-
prior-experience condition.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that regret in the conditions with a
valid reason for the subsequent decision (i.e., positive/repeat
and negative/switch) will be less than that in the conditions
without a valid reason (i.e., positive/switch and negative/re-
peat). Consistent with our prediction, the pooled mean across
the positive/repeat and negative/switch conditions is consid-
erably less than the pooled mean across the positive/switch
and negative/repeat conditions. This difference is statistically
significant (airline: , ; backpack:t p 12.14 p ! .01 t p232 232
, ; and hotel: , ). Thus, the6.54 p ! .01 t p 11.06 p ! .01232
conditions in which the decision was reinforced by a good
reason resulted in less regret than the conditions in which the
decision seemed inconsistent with the prior experience. This
supports hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the status quo effect will reverse
in the negative-prior-experience condition, leading to switch-
ing being regretted less than repeating. Coupled with the status
quo effect in the control and positive-prior-experience con-
ditions, a disordinal interaction between decision and expe-
rience should obtain. The MANOVA results reveal this pre-
dicted interaction (Wilks’s lambda ,F(6, 460) p 10.58 p !
). Furthermore, neither the decision nor the prior-expe-.001
rience main effect is significant. In order to completely test
our prediction of a status quo effect reversal, we contrast the
regret across decision conditions in the presence of a negative
experience. Repeating is regretted significantly more than
switching in all three scenarios (airline: ,t p 6.13 p !232
; backpack: , ; and hotel: ,.01 t p 3.68 p ! .01 t p 6.17232 232
). As we predicted in hypothesis 3, the status quo effectp ! .01
reverses in the negative-prior-experience condition.
STUDY 2
The findings of study 1 suggest that the status quo effect
makes repeat purchase less subject to regret than switching.
However, when strong reasons are presented for the sub-
sequent decision, there is less resulting regret and the status
quo effect disappears. We now extend these findings by
demonstrating that a second source of reasons, the amount
of previous experience or history with the good or service,
also influences the amount of regret associated with a choice.
We draw on recent work in the quality literature to predict
that consumers, in the case in which they have extensive
experience with the good or service, will feel less regret for
repeat purchase and greater regret for switching.
Rust et al. (1999) develop a Bayesian data integration and
updating model of quality perceptions and show that the
impact of a single outcome on consumers’ perceptions of
quality is moderated by consumers’ amount of previous ex-
perience. In other words, consumers integrate new infor-
mation, such as a specific transaction, with their cumulative
quality perceptions (e.g., Bolton and Drew 1991; Boulding
et al. 1993). Consumers with a longer history of using a
brand have more strongly held beliefs about the brand’s
quality than consumers with a shorter usage history. Since
the updated quality perception is a blend of the prior belief
and the perception of the specific encounter or experience,
the relative weight placed on the prior belief should be
greater for consumers with a longer brand history. Across
two experiments, Rust et al. (1999) find that a single ex-
perience has less impact on more experienced consumers
(i.e., they update their quality perceptions to a lesser degree)
than on less experienced consumers. Boulding, Kalra, and
Staelin (1999) replicate these findings in a service setting.
In terms of the status quo effect and reasons, this research
suggests that a greater amount of experience or history with
a brand may increase consumers’ commitment to the status
quo alternative and moderate the effect demonstrated in study
1. We therefore predict that the status quo effect reversal
demonstrated in study 1 will only be evident for low levels
of prior history with the status quo alternative. Specifically,
one should experience more regret for switching in the face
of an extensive brand history than for switching in the face
of a limited brand history. In contrast, repeating should result
in less regret when it is prefaced by an extensive brand history
than when it is prefaced by a limited brand history. In other
words, extensive history should rotate the experience #
interaction predicted by hypothesis 3, resulting in adecision
interaction:history # decision
H4: Extensive brand history will decrease regret in the
repeat condition (compared to low history) and
increase it in the switching condition.
To our knowledge, the only other research examining the
role of amount of history in the status quo effect is Hesketh
(1996), who found evidence—in a vocational-training con-
text—that longer-tenured employees were more committed
to the status quo. However, the more-tenured employees
differed from less-tenured employees in that they were also
older, had lower qualification levels, and saw less potential
for future promotion. Since a multivariate analysis was not
performed, it is unclear whether the resistance to changing
the status quo was due to tenure or to these other factors.
In order to increase internal validity, we experimentally ma-
nipulate the amount of brand history in study 2.
Method
Subjects and Design.Subjects were 406 undergraduate
students at a large midwestern university who participated
in the study in return for extra credit. The study was a 2
(decision: switch/repeat) # 2 (history: high/low) # 3 (prior
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experience: control/positive/negative) between-subjects de-
sign replicated across three categories.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to study 1. Sub-
jects were asked to read three scenarios, one about an airline,
one about a backpack, and one about a hotel. Subjects gave
their reactions to each scenario immediately after reading the
scenario. In addition to the three-item regret scale, subjects
completed a manipulation check for brand history. The check
asked them, “How much experience did you have with ___
prior to the present trip (purchase)?” (anchored by very little/
very much). The history manipulation appears to have been
successful because there is a significant difference between
the manipulation-check means in the high- and low-history
conditions in each scenario.
Results
The results across conditions are shown in table 1. We
analyze our data with MANOVA. As in study 1, hypothesis
3 is supported by the significant-prior-experience # decision
interaction (Wilks’s lambda , ).F(6, 784) p 18.64 p ! .001
Furthermore, both the decision and the prior-experience main
effects are significant (Wilks’s lambda ,F(3, 392) p 5.37
and Wilks’s lambda , , re-p ! .01 F(6, 784) p 2.19 p ! .05
spectively). The decision main effect is the result of greater
regret from switching than from repeating. The experience
main effect is only significant in the backpack scenario
( , ) and results from lower regret inF(1, 394) p 3.67 p ! .05
the positive-prior-experience condition.
Turning to the effects of brand history, we find that the
interaction is significant (Wilks’s lambdahistory # decision
, ), as we predicted in hypothesisF(3, 392) p 5.52 p ! .001
4. Specifically, a high level of history led to lower regret
in the repeat condition (airline: vs. 7.4; backpack:M p 6.7
vs. 7.5; hotel: vs. 7.3 for high and lowM p 6.7 M p 7.1
history, respectively) and to higher regret in the switch con-
dition (airline: vs. 7.7; backpack: vs. 7.0;M p 7.9 M p 7.6
hotel: vs. 7.3 for high and low history, respec-M p 8.0
tively). In the airline scenario, the difference in the repeat
condition is statistically significant ( , ).t p 3.04 p ! .01391
For the backpack scenario, both differences are significant
( , , and , , for the repeatt p 3.53 p ! .01 t p 2.27 p ! .01391 391
and switch condition, respectively). And for the hotel sce-
nario, the difference in the switch condition is significant
( , ). As we show in table 1, a highert p 2.99 p ! .01391
amount of history tends to rotate the experience #
interaction by decreasing regret in the repeat con-decision
ditions and increasing regret in the switching conditions, per
hypothesis 4. Regret is less in the extensive-history/repeat
conditions than in the low-history/repeat conditions in eight
of the nine cases (i.e., three experience conditions #
product categories), and a sign test is statistically sig-three
nificant ( ). Conversely, regret is greater in the high-p ! .05
history/switch conditions than in the low-history/switch
conditions in each of the nine cases (sign test ).p ! .01
Interestingly, in the conditions in which high history had
to be traded off against immediate prior experience, it ap-
pears that prior experience still carried a relatively large
weight (e.g., the average regret for repeat was 8.0 vs. a
regret for switching of 7.0 in the negative-experience con-
dition). Future research might explore the conditions under
which this difference might be completely eliminated or
even reversed. Furthermore, an unexpected main effect of
history is evident (Wilks’s lambda ,F(3, 392) p 3.86 p !
). This is not a particularly strong finding because the.01
history effect is not significant in any of the three scenarios.
Furthermore, interpretation is difficult because there is less
regret in the extensive-history condition than in the low-
history condition for the airline and backpack scenarios but
more regret in the extensive-history condition than in the
low-history condition in the hotel scenario.
We again test hypothesis 1’s prediction that the results in
the control condition will not differ significantly from the
results in the positive-prior-experience condition by per-
forming the MANOVA after dropping the negative-prior-
experience condition. As in study 1, the decision main effect
is significant in both the MANOVA (Wilks’s lambda
, ) and in each scenario-levelF(3, 266) p 28.10 p ! .0001
ANOVA. The interaction isdecision # prior-experience
only marginally significant (Wilks’s lambda F(3, 266) p
, ). Importantly, the inter-2.50 p ! .10 history # decision
action remains statistically significant in the MANOVA
(Wilks’s lambda , ) and in eachF(3, 266) p 2.67 p ! .05
scenario-level ANOVA. As we observed in study 1, the
results in the control condition mirror those in the positive-
experience condition.
We test hypotheses 2 and 3 by analyzing the results in
the low-history condition. As we predicted in hypothesis 2,
regret across the strong-reason conditions (negative expe-
rience/switch and positive experience/repeat) is substantially
lower than regret across the weak-reason conditions (neg-
ative experience/repeat and positive experience/switch) in
all three scenarios. Furthermore, hypothesis 3 is strongly
supported because the interaction isexperience # decision
statistically significant in the MANOVA (Wilks’s lambda
, ) as well as in each scenario.F(6, 390) p 11.60 p ! .001
Thus, hypotheses 1–3 are all replicated in study 2.
STUDY 3
Our theorizing is based on the argument that people feel
more regret for decisions that are not backed up by good
reasons. This corresponds with some of the earlier insights
into the psychology of regret. For example, Sugden (1985)
argues that regret arises from self-recrimination and is most
pronounced when the decision was unreasonable or inde-
fensible. He argues that regret “depends upon something
more than the nature of the two consequences you are com-
paring. It seems to depend also on the extent to which you
can defend your original decision to yourself as reasonable,
sensible or normal” (p. 86). Our objective in the third study
is to formally test the premise that prior information provides
a reason for a subsequent decision to change or maintain
the status quo. Finding evidence in this regard will support
our argument that consumers should feel less regret for
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choices that seem to be upheld by the circumstances. We
expect to observe three outcomes. First, the proportion of
subjects who decide to repeat purchase should be greater
when the previous experience is positive than when it is
negative.
H5: The probability of repeat purchase will be greater
following a positive experience than following a
negative experience.
Second, if maintaining the status quo is in fact the default
choice, the repeat-purchase percentage in the control group
should be closer to the proportion observed in the positive-
prior-experience condition than to the that observed in the
negative-prior-experience condition.
H6: The probability of repeat purchase in the con-
trol condition will be more similar to that of the
positive-experience condition than to that of the
negative-experience condition.
Finally, subjects should feel a greater need to justify de-
viating from the status quo. Researchers have found that de-
cision makers often choose the alternative with the greatest
number of supporting reasons (e.g., Montgomery 1983). If
consumers feel that repeating is inherently more justifiable
than switching, they should, to compensate, provide a greater
number of reasons for a decision to switch than for a decision
to repeat.
H7: More reasons will be given for switching than for
repeating.
Method
Procedure. Seventy-one undergraduate students partic-
ipated in the experiment. The stimuli were identical to those
used in study 1, except that the outcome of the subsequent
decision was not described. Subjects were asked to read each
scenario, to record which alternative they would choose, and
to list as many reasons as they wished for having made this
decision.
Results
The results are consistent with hypothesis 5. Subjects
were much more likely to choose the original alternative
again when the prior experience was positive (80%) than
when it was negative (7%). Furthermore, this pattern was
observed for each of the three scenarios (airlines: 65% vs.
0%, backpacks: 83% vs. 13%, and hotels: 91% vs. 9%).
Since our variable is categorical (i.e., choice of the original
good or service), we analyze the results using logistic re-
gression. As we expected, prior experience exerts a strong
influence on repeat purchase, as evinced by the log likeli-
hood (LL) of 186.3 versus the intercept-only model LL of
284.6 ( , ). As in studies 1 and 2, the2x (2) p 98.3 p ! .001
effect is robust across scenarios, as the LL only marginally
improves to 183.4 ( , NS) when scenario terms2x (2) p 2.9
are added to the model. However, the interaction of prior
experience and scenario is significant, as evinced by the LL
of 173.6 ( , ). This is because of the con-2x (4) p 9.8 p ! .05
trol condition in the backpack scenario, which we will dis-
cuss later.
Further, the repeat purchase proportion in the control group
is more similar to that of the positive-prior-experience con-
dition than to that of the negative-prior-experience condition
(hypothesis 6). This is the case in the overall sample and for
each scenario. In order to statistically assess this difference,
we performed two sets of logistic regressions—one with only
the negative-prior-experience condition and the control con-
dition and the other with only the positive-prior-experience
condition and the control condition. In the comparison of the
control condition to the negative-prior-experience condition,
the repeat-purchase proportion is significantly different be-
tween the two groups for the total sample ( ,2x (1) p 66.4
) as well as for each scenario (airlines: 86% vs. 0%,p ! .001
backpacks: 52% vs. 13%, and hotels: 78% vs. 9% for control
vs. negative prior experience, respectively). In contrast, the
repeat-purchase proportions in the positive-prior-experience
condition and the control condition are not significantly dif-
ferent from one another for the total sample ( ,2x (1) p 1.2
NS), and only one significant scenario-level difference
emerges (backpack: , ). However, in the2x (1) p 5.4 p ! .05
backpack scenario, the proportion of repeat purchases in the
control group (52%) was closer to the positive-prior-experi-
ence group (83%) than to the negative-prior-experience group
(13%).
Finally, we analyzed the reasons that subjects gave for
their decision. Subjects who chose to switch gave more
reasons (2.2) than subjects who chose to repeat (1.8). This
difference was statistically different ( ,F(1, 202) p 11.98
), providing support for hypothesis 7. As one wouldp ! .001
expect, the content of the reasons was quite different as
well. The subjects who switched tended to cite the poor
quality of the prior experience, while the subjects who re-
peated tended to mention the familiar nature of the status
quo alternative. Interestingly, several subjects wrote “if it
ain’t broke don’t fix it,” which is suggestive of folk knowl-
edge (e.g., Friestad and Wright 1994) about maintaining the
status quo.
STUDY 4
The results of study 3 suggest that information about a
prior experience with a product or service can provide rea-
sons for consumers to switch to an alternative. However,
we have not examined the effect of reasons for the decision
beyond those provided by prior experience. This is the pur-
pose of study 4. We argue that postdecision regret should
be mitigated in the presence of a strong reason. In order to
control for multiple interpretations and for between-subjects
variability, we provide specific reasons as part of each sce-
nario. Furthermore, we formally test our main thesis that
reasons for a decision make it more justifiable and inoculate
the decision maker against regret. That is, the perceived
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justifiability of the decision should mediate the effects of
experience and decision:
H8: The status quo effect will be eliminated when there
is a strong reason for the decision but will still be
present when there is a weak reason.
H9: The effects of reason and decision on subsequent
regret will be mediated by the perceived justifia-
bility of the decision.
Method
Reason Stimuli Development.We began by using the
reasons given by subjects in study 3 to generate a list of
relatively strong and weak reasons for the second decision
in each scenario. We also developed two additional scenar-
ios, one involving a frequently purchased product (deodor-
ant) and the other involving the purchase of clothing (jeans).
We then pretested the strength of these reasons with a sample
of undergraduate students. Specifically, respondents were
shown each scenario up to the second decision and were
asked to evaluate several possible reasons for the subsequent
decision. We used the following criteria to select reasons:
(a) the strong-reason evaluation had to be significantly
greater than the weak-reason evaluation, and (b) the reason
evaluation had to be consistent across experimental condi-
tions (Perdue and Summers 1986). Strong and weak reasons
were readily identified for the airline, backpack, deodorant,
and jeans scenarios. However, only one reason in the hotel
scenario (exterior corridors) was rated as relatively weak,
and this reason exhibited a significant experience # decision
interaction. Thus, a hotel scenario was not included in the
study. Using the pretest results, we changed the reasons for
the backpack scenario slightly. The reason treatment levels
for each scenario were as follows:
Strong reason Weak reason
Airline Better flight times Curbside check-in










Jeans Tried on many, liked
comfort, fashion,
and durability
Liked their recent TV ad
Subjects and Design.Ninety-two undergraduate busi-
ness students at a large midwestern university participated
in the study in return for extra credit. The study was a 2
(decision: switch/repeat) # 2 (reason strength: strong/weak)
between-subjects design with replication across four product
categories (airline, backpack, deodorant, and jeans). For ex-
ample, a subject in the switch–strong reason condition read
a scenario for each product category in which the protagonist
had a strong reason for switching.
Procedure. As in the previous studies, we manipulated
the decision at two levels (i.e., switch or repeat purchase)
by describing the subject in the scenario as either switching
to a different alternative or selecting the same alternative
on the subsequent choice occasion. Reason strength was
manipulated via the description of the subject’s underlying
reason for the choice. In order to induce a sense of regret,
the second experience was always negative, regardless of
condition. After reading the scenario, subjects completed
the same three-item regret scale used in the first two studies
as well as a decision-justifiability scale. The latter scale
assessed the perceived justifiability of each decision via
three questions ( , 0.95, 0.94, and 0.92 for the air-a p 0.91
line, backpack, deodorant, and jeans scenarios, respec-
tively): “How justifiable is the decision to repeat (switch)?”
(anchored by strongly justifiable/weakly justifiable), “How
easy to defend is the decision to repeat (switch)?” (anchored
by easy to defend/not easy to defend), and “How logical is
the decision to repeat (switch)?” (anchored by very logical/
very illogical).
Results
Since we seek to examine the mediating effect of justi-
fiability and the experimental design is between subjects
with a replication across categories, we analyze the data
using seemingly unrelated regression. When the independent
variables are the same in each model (as was the case in
studies 1 and 2), seemingly unrelated regression yields iden-
tical results as estimating each model separately, so MAN-
OVA was an appropriate method for those studies. Unfor-
tunately, MANOVA is not feasible in study 4 because it
cannot incorporate different independent variables across
models and thus cannot include the perceived justifiability
of the decision in each scenario (subjects provided a justi-
fiability judgment for each decision). Thus, we use a system
of equations to estimate the effects simultaneously across
categories.
First, we examine the parameters estimated across cate-
gories, which is analogous to estimating the overall effect
of the independent variables in MANOVA. Both the reason-
strength main effect ( , ) and the decisionb p 0.33 p ! .05
main effect ( , ) are significant. Since reasonb p 0.38 p ! .01
is coded as a 1 for the strong-reason condition and 1 for
the weak-reason condition, the negative sign of the param-
eter indicates that strong reasons result in less regret. This
supports hypothesis 2. The switch condition is coded as a
1, and the repeat condition is coded as a 1. Thus the
positive parameter estimate implies that, consistent with the
status quo effect, switching was regretted more than re-
peating. Importantly, the reason inter-strength # decision
action is significant ( , ) and is driven byb p 0.36 p ! .05
the absence of a status quo effect in the strong-reason con-
dition. That is, examining the means pooled across scenarios
(see table 2), the difference in regret between repeat and
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TABLE 2
STUDY 4: REGRET MEANS ACROSS CONDITIONS
Repeat Switch
Pooled average:
Strong reason 7.22 (1.62) 7.33 (1.59)
Weak reason 7.40 (1.43) 8.73 (1.07)
Airline:
Strong reason 7.29 (2.04) 7.54 (1.79)
Weak reason 7.26 (1.87) 8.56 (1.49)
Backpack:
Strong reason 7.33 (1.80) 7.02 (2.09)
Weak reason 7.14 (1.44) 8.68 (1.59)
Deodorant:
Strong reason 7.59 (1.93) 7.71 (1.84)
Weak reason 7.49 (2.09) 9.08 (1.00)
Jeans:
Strong reason 6.67 (2.36) 7.05 (1.96)
Weak reason 7.71 (1.74) 8.62 (1.73)
NOTE.—Standard deviation is shown in parentheses.
switch is significant in the weak-reason condition (t p91
, ) but not in the strong-reason condition2.36 p ! .05
( , NS). Thus, hypothesis 8 is supported.t p 0.1891
The results are consistent with our thesis across product
categories. The reason-strength parameter is significant for
the backpack ( , ), jeans ( ,b p 0.37 p ! .05 b p 0.65
), and deodorant scenarios ( , ),p ! .01 b p 0.32 p ! .10
while the decision parameter is significant for the airline
( , ), deodorant ( , ), andb p 0.39 p ! .05 b p 0.43 p ! .05
backpack scenarios ( , ). Furthermore, theb p 0.31 p ! .10
interaction parameter is signif-reason-strength # decision
icant for the backpack ( , ) and deodorantb p 0.46 p ! .01
scenarios ( , ) and is negative but insig-b p 0.37 p ! .05
nificant in the airline ( , NS) and jeans scenariosb p 0.26
( , NS). Comparing the means between decisionb p 0.13
conditions for the strong versus the weak reason, we find
that the status quo effect does not obtain in the strong-reason
condition for any of the scenarios (all , NS).t ’s ! 0.6491
However, the difference between the switch and the repeat
conditions is significant in the weak-reason condition for all
four scenarios (i.e., airline: , ; backpack:t p 3.02 p ! .0191
, ; deodorant: , ; jeans:t p 3.15 p ! .01 t p 3.22 p ! .0191 91
, ).t p 1.65 p ! .1091
Having established that reasons impact the regret expe-
rienced over decisions gone awry, we now proceed to test
whether this effect is mediated by the justifiability of the
decision (hypothesis 9). For mediation to occur, three con-
ditions must be satisfied (Baron and Kenny 1986). First, the
independent variables must exert a significant effect on the
dependent variable. This condition is satisfied, as we already
discussed. Second, the independent variables must exert a
significant effect on the potential mediator, which, in this
instance, is perceived justifiability. Results of a seemingly
unrelated regression show that this is the case because the
reason effect ( , ), the decision effectb p 0.82 p ! .01
( , ), and the interactionb p 0.72 p ! .01 reason # decision
( , ) are all significant. As we expected,b p 0.39 p ! .01
stronger reasons are perceived as more justifiable, as are
repeat purchases.
The final step of the mediation analysis is to add the me-
diator to the original analysis and to examine the change in
the original parameters. If they fall to insignificance, complete
mediation is observed, while if the effect declines but remains
significant, partial mediation is observed. When perceived
justifiability is added to the model, its parameter is significant
( , ). Thus, when the decision is perceived asb p 0.19 p ! .01
more difficult to justify, regret is greater. Furthermore, the
parameter estimates for the other variables all decrease, and
two of the effects become insignificant while one remains
only weakly significant. Specifically, the reason-strength pa-
rameter declines from its original value of 0.33 ( )p ! .05
to a value of 0.16 and is insignificant. Similarly, the decision
parameter drops from its original value of 0.38 ( ) top ! .01
a value of 0.18 and becomes insignificant. The change in the
interaction parameter is not quite as marked as these, but
it does exhibit a decrease, falling from a value of 0.36
( ) to a value of 0.28, and is only weakly significantp ! .02
( ).p ! .10
Table 3 shows that the mediation results are relatively
robust across the four product categories. In all four sce-
narios, the reason-strength and decision effects are reduced
substantially when justifiability is added to the model. In
addition, inclusion of justifiability in the model reduces the
interaction in the backpack and deodorantreason # decision
scenarios. The results of the pooled and scenario-level anal-
yses suggest that justifiability almost completely mediates
the main effects of reason strength and decision (repeat vs.
switch) on postdecision regret, as well as their interaction.
Thus, hypothesis 9’s prediction that perceived justifiability
attenuates postdecision regret is supported.
DISCUSSION
From a normative perspective, consumers should tend to
switch after a bad experience and tend to repeat after a good
experience, but the regret literature has identified violations
of these behavioral or social norms. That is, the literature
suggests that greater regret is experienced after switches than
after repeats. Because the regret literature has tended to use
impoverished scenarios that force subjects to infer the ac-
tor’s reasons for the decision, it has obscured the possibility
that switching behavior may or may not be the norm de-
pending on the situation. In this article, we have built on
Luce’s (1998) work on negative emotion and Shafir, Si-
monson, and Tversky’s (1993) work on reason-based choice
to argue that when a decision is perceived as justified, the
status quo effect is eliminated. We demonstrate that reasons
determine the normative status of one’s repeat/switch de-
cisions and that such decisions, in turn, affect the experience
of regret.
Amplified regret following a repeat purchase occurs when
people feel that a regrettable decision not to switch was less
reasonable than a regrettable decision to switch. Consistent
with this result, we find that subjects reported that in the
event of a positive prior experience, the actor who decided
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TABLE 3
STUDY 4: MEDIATION ANALYSIS PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Justifiability
Regret
Justifiability omitted Justifiability included
Pooled model:
Reason .82 (5.84) .33 (2.28) .16 (1.13)
Decision .72 (5.14) .38 (2.63) .18 (1.26)
Reason # decision .39 (2.80) .36 (2.52) .28 (1.95)
Justifiability . . . . . . .19 (5.32)
Airline:
Reason .27 (1.39) .25 (1.34) .17 (.92)
Decision .42 (2.14) .39 (2.07) .28 (1.47)
Reason # decision .09 (.48) .26 (1.39) .26 (1.39)
Justifiability . . . . . . .20 (2.62)
Backpack:
Reason 1.45 (6.84) .37 (2.03) .02 (.08)
Decision .76 (3.58) .31 (1.69) .11 (.60)
Reason # decision .60 (2.83) .46 (2.57) .35 (1.96)
Justifiability . . . . . . .23 (3.46)
Deodorant:
Reason .60 (2.74) .32 (1.73) .20 (1.06)
Decision 1.36 (6.21) .43 (2.35) .17 (.82)
Reason # decision .74 (3.36) .37 (2.00) .24 (1.26)
Justifiability . . . . . . .18 (2.39)
Jeans:
Reason 1.25 (5.39) .65 (3.21) .34 (1.57)
Decision .65 (2.79) .32 (1.58) .14 (.69)
Reason # decision .11 (.47) .13 (.65) .14 (.73)
Justifiability . . . . . . .22 (3.28)
NOTE.—t-value is shown in parentheses.
to switch would feel more regret than the actor who decided
to repeat. In contrast, when the prior experience was neg-
ative, subjects indicated that the actor who decided to switch
would feel less regret than the actor who decided to repeat.
The switching consumer at least tried to prevent further
losses, whereas the repeating consumer did nothing despite
circumstances suggesting that some avoidance action be
taken. This result is extended to the case in which consumers
have a longer history of experience with the status quo
option (study 2). Study 4 tests this notion with less extreme
reasons and supports our prediction that good reasons mit-
igate postdecision regret. By demonstrating that prior cir-
cumstances can result in the reversal of the status quo effect,
we extend the status quo effect literature to situations in
which information about prior experiences is available. Ar-
guably, situations such as these resemble everyday consumer
choice to a greater extent than situations in which such
information is unavailable.
In their perceived service quality results, Rust et al. (1999)
find that a longer history with an alternative tends to “in-
oculate consumers to some extent against a single substan-
dard outcome” (p. 87). Similarly, we find that a longer his-
tory attenuates the ensuing regret caused by the episode
immediately preceding the decision. This finding has inter-
esting implications, particularly in light of recent research
into the role of regret on subsequent behavior. For example,
researchers have found that consumers who regret their
choice are less likely to repurchase that alternative on a
subsequent occasion, regardless of the amount of dissatis-
faction with the chosen product (Zeelenberg, Inman, and
Pieters 2001). Similarly, in another study focusing on con-
sumer dissatisfaction with services, Zeelenberg and Pieters
(1999) report that the experience of regret—over and above
the effects of dissatisfaction—promotes switching to another
service provider. Prior history should protect the brand from
such downstream behaviors.
In study 2, we implicitly assumed that the brand history
was positive. Future research is needed to examine the rel-
ative effects of negative versus positive brand history be-
cause it may be that the valance of the historical experience
is less important than the mere amount of brand history. For
example, Hartman et al. (1991) surveyed long-time utility
customers. They divided customers into two groups—one
that had experienced an average of three two-hour outages
per year and one that had experienced an average of 15 four-
hour outages per year. Each household was presented a menu
of six alternative electrical utility plans with their present
level of service (i.e., the status quo) clearly indicated. The
options were configured for each group to represent realistic
service alternatives versus the status quo. Despite their
markedly different levels of service, the results were quite
similar across the two groups. Over 60% of the group with
a higher service level chose the status quo plan, compared
to 58% of the consumers with a lower service level. This
reluctance to switch utility service despite such poor service
is consistent with our results in study 2.
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Implications for Consumer Research and Practice
These findings have implications for the stream of research
on the status quo effect. Namely, they suggest that previous
information or experience provides underlying reasons for
decisions. If there is sufficient motivation to warrant a switch,
then consumers feel less regret in the face of a subsequent
negative performance by the chosen alternative. This implies
that feelings of regret are mitigated to the extent to which the
consumer reflects and concludes that the decision was ap-
propriate given the available information. Consumers who
anticipate greater regret for repeat purchase than for switching
should be more likely to switch as a result. This phenomenon
could result from consumers’ high expectations of service
providers and product manufacturers. Failures are perceived
as intolerable events, and consumers avoid them by switching
to alternative providers. For marketing practitioners, this sug-
gests that a larger-share brand might design its communica-
tions to position itself as the normative alternative.
It is interesting to note that the difference in regret be-
tween repeating and switching was greater in the negative-
prior-experience condition than in the positive-prior-expe-
rience condition. Examining study 1, we find that regret is
directionally greater in the negative/repeat condition
( ) than in the positive/switch condition ( ).M p 8.1 M p 7.6
Furthermore, regret is less in the negative/switch condition
( ) than in the positive/repeat condition ( ).M p 5.8 M p 6.8
This difference is statistically significant for all three sce-
narios. The pattern is similar in study 3. Regret is signifi-
cantly greater in the negative/repeat condition than in the
positive/switch condition ( vs. 7.9, ,M p 8.5 t p 1.79136
) and is directionally less in the negative/switch con-p ! .10
dition than in the positive/switch condition ( vs.M p 6.3
6.7). This effect may result from negative previous expe-
rience, which causes decision makers to consider changing
and induces them think about their reasons for changing.
Prior research has found that causal search and counterfac-
tual processing tend to be more elaborate following negative
outcomes than following positive outcomes (e.g., Van den
Bos, Vermunt, and Wilke 1997). Hence, the decision to
switch or repeat is likely to be the product of a more effortful
process following a negative prior outcome than following
a positive prior outcome. This should amplify decision regret
in negative-prior-experience conditions.
Status quo effects have intriguing implications for policy
makers as well. When forecasting acceptance of new pro-
grams and policies, officials must take into account the status
quo nature of longer-standing policies and programs. Our
findings imply that communications campaigns should be
designed with the aim of convincing the public that a good
reason exists for a change. Such a need-for-change com-
munications strategy might also be used in public service
campaigns about teen smoking and underage drinking as
well as in school referendums, etc. The recent failure of the
Mississippi state flag referendum is a good example. Voters
did not perceive a good reason to change the flag design,
and the referendum failed.
Our finding that decision justifiability attenuates post-
decision regret might be expected to extend to contexts in-
volving the omission bias (Zeelenberg et al. 2002). Kah-
neman and Tversky (1982) were the first to document the
phenomenon that acts of omission are regretted much less
than acts of commission. They showed subjects a scenario
describing two investors, Paul and George. Paul considered
switching his investment, but did nothing (omission), while
George switched investments (commission). Although both
investors incurred the same loss, the vast majority (92%) of
the subjects indicated more regret for George, who had
acted, than for Paul, who had decided not to act. Since the
reasons for choosing to act or not to act in Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1982) scenario are unclear, subjects might have
tried to infer why the two actors decided differently. If so,
they might conclude that George had less justification for
his decision to act than Paul had for his decision not to act.
Our results suggest that the results would be reversed if
subjects had been provided with information (e.g., the in-
vestments’ relative performance) that suggested a better rea-
son for George’s decision than for Paul’s.
Limitations and Future Research
We focused here only on regret. It would be worthwhile
to examine the role of other decision-related emotions. One
likely candidate is disappointment, the feeling experienced
in comparing a received outcome versus prior expectations
(e.g., Bell 1985). Disappointment has been shown to influ-
ence postchoice valuation (Inman et al. 1997; Zeelenberg
and Pieters 1999) independently of regret effects. However,
more work is needed to examine the relative effect of each
on decision making in general and on the status quo effect
in particular. Furthermore, in our studies we did not consider
that consumers might delay their decision to cope with regret
(Cooke, Meyvis, and Schwartz 2001). Research suggests
that consumers might either avoid feedback (e.g., Janis and
Mann 1977) or avoid decisions altogether (e.g., Luce 1998)
as mechanisms of dealing with potential regret. This rep-
resents an interesting direction for future work.
This research has examined some interesting issues with
respect to the experience of regret. Our findings suggest that
the reason that prior experience and decision interact is that
the norm differs in the two cases. Future research should
explore consumers’ reactions when other behavioral norms
are placed into conflict with these. For example, switching
behavior may be a norm in its own right in a new or turbulent
market. If many people switch even when past experience
was good, arguably they should feel less regret if the sub-
sequent experience is negative. Furthermore, when multiple
conflicting norms are available, future research should ex-
amine which particular norms are focused on to enhance or
minimize feelings of regret. Finally, we have argued subjects
feel less regret when existing information implies that their
chosen alternative is superior. Conversely, if a person is
asked to choose among alternatives on the basis of no in-
formation, there may be little ensuing regret. That is, if there
is no good reason to pick any particular alternative, there
is little reason to kick oneself. Together, these predictions
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suggest that regret may have its greatest impact when the
evidence for the chosen alternative is mixed. This suggests
a somewhat circumscribed role for regret.
[Received June 1999. Revised August 2001. David Glen
Mick served as editor, and Joel Huber served as associate
editor for this article.]
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